In the United States, the academic fields of public administration and public management are diverging. Public management focuses primarily on the orthodox values of efficiency, cost-effectiveness, favorable benefit-cost ratios, and performance measurement. It is also concerned with the "tools" of public management and the key elements of contemporary collaborative governance, including outsourcing, designing contracts, managing and monitoring contractors, and steering within the framework of networks. It views accountability from the perspectives of obtaining results (outcomes) and creating value for money. Results are overwhelmingly defined in terms of core mission objectives and the operations that are ancillary to their achievement, such as deploying financial, human, and other resources efficiently and cost-effectively. Public administration is also interested in all of the above. However, it retains the field's historic interest in public values and processes. This analysis contends that although mission-extrinsic public values can be difficult to measure, a balanced scorecard approach is feasible. Moreover, failure to incorporate such values into contemporary performance-oriented public management risks impeding their attainment and adversely affecting the quality and character of government and administration.
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The problem of mission-extrinsic public values
Mission-extrinsic public values are problematic in contemporary performance management because they are not typically central or ancillary to the achievement of public agencies' core missions. In Koppell's ' (2003, pp. 72-5) . Rather they resemble "non-mission preferences." Mission-related activities can be defined as operations that 'strike at the center of an organization's function' and 'relate to the utilization of an organization's core technology or competence' (Koppell, 2003, p. 73) . By contrast, non-mission preferences address 'the manner in which an agency pursues its policy objectives'. They 'are often procedural in character' and 'distinguished by their broadness' (Koppell, 2003, p. 73) .
Building on Koppell (2003), these preferences can be either integral or extrinsic to achieving core mission objectives. They are integral when they produce better core mission results. For instance, the core mission of the US federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is to 'protect human health and the environment' (EPA, 2012). It does this by making rules, such as for clean air, according to non-mission-related procedural preferences for transparency and public participation mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, as amended. Arguably, these procedures reduce litigation and/or yield better rules and are therefore integral to the EPA's achievement of its core mission.
Non-mission-related preferences may also be extrinsic to the achievement of agencies' core mission objectives. In this case, they: (1) do not support achieving the central purposes, core activities, and raison d'être of agencies and programs; (2) are unrelated to an agency's specialized competencies and technologies; (3) promote preferences that are extraneous to organizational missions and may even impede them; (4) are imposed across all agencies in one-size-fits-all fashion that is not strategically tailored to individual missions; and (5) are not necessarily supported by agency leaders and personnel.
Not all preferences rise to the level of public values. Those that do are generally associated with political system attributes or macropolicy objectives. They enjoy legitimacy by virtue of their authoritative allocation by lawful governmental action and/or their broad and widely accepted base in professional, social, economic, or political practice. They are found in constitutions, public laws, executive orders, judicial decisions, and other official proclamations and regulations that control agency operations as well as in regime values (Rohr, 1978; Rosenbloom, 2012a Rosenbloom, , 2012b . 1 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), which requires federal agencies to develop environmental impact statements for actions significantly affecting the environment, seeks to promote the macropolicy objective of having a 'national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; […] promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man;
